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Abstract
Two experiments were conducted to investigate whether physical and observational practice in task-sharing entail
comparable implicit motor learning. To this end, the social-transfer-of-learning (SToL) effect was assessed when both
participants performed the joint practice task (Experiment 1 – complete task-sharing), or when one participant observed the
other performing half of the practice task (Experiment 2 – evocative task-sharing). Since the inversion of the spatial relations
between responding agent and stimulus position has been shown to prevent SToL, in the present study we assessed it in
both complete and evocative task-sharing conditions either when spatial relations were kept constant or changed from the
practice to the transfer session. The same pattern of results was found for both complete and evocative task-sharing, thus
suggesting that implicit motor learning in evocative task-sharing is equivalent to that obtained in complete task-sharing.
We conclude that this motor learning originates from the simulation of the complementary (rather than the imitative)
action.
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Introduction
It is well known that the ability to improve performance by
observation, without physical practice, is a basic powerful human
capacity (e.g. [1–6]). Even though researchers assessing the neuro-
cognitive mechanisms supporting observational learning refer to
this human ability by using different definitions (such as motor
resonance, motor simulation, embodied simulation or mirroring;
hereinafter we use the term motor simulation), they share the basic
notion that action observation activates representations of
corresponding motor programs in the observer’s brain. The
available empirical evidence suggests the existence of a basic
neurophysiological system sub-serving this motor simulation.
Single-cell recordings have indeed shown that some neurons,
called mirror neurons, discharge both when a monkey performs or
observes a given action [7,8]. A similar mirror mechanism has
been found in humans by means of functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) investigations, by magnetoencephalography and
by transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) studies (for review see
[9,10]).
All together, these findings suggest that when we observe
another individual acting, our motor system in the brain simulates
under threshold the perceived action and this simulation leads to
motor facilitation for imitative behavior. However, many actions
that we perform everyday require coordination with other people,
rather than imitation of their actual action. If we think of simple
situations, like dressing a child, or complex situations, like moving
together with another person a heavy piece of furniture up a curvy
staircase, it is clear that motor facilitation for imitative behavior
would be most of the time detrimental for efficient performance.
In these task-sharing situations (from now on, we will refer to them
as ‘‘evocative task-sharing’’ situations), complementary rather than
imitative acts are functional to properly reach a common goal.
There is some evidence that motor simulation in evocative task-
sharing situations favors the activation of the complementary
action, rather than of the imitative action. For instance, Newman-
Norlund et al. [11] showed that the mirror mechanism is involved
in planning both imitative and complementary actions depending
on the task context. In their study, participants were required to
observe a model grasping a manipulandum, either with a whole
hand or with a precision grip, within an imitative or a
complementary context. In the imitative condition, participants
were asked to perform the observed action, while in the
complementary condition participants had to execute the opposite
grasp (for example, if they observed a precision grip they executed
a whole hand grip). fMRI results indicated that action execution
was facilitated by the observation of the identical action in the
imitative context or by the observation of a different action in the
complementary context. Such a finding is in line with the results
by Ocampo and Kritikos [12] showing that during action
observation the goal of the action and the context in which the
action is performed shape the responses of our motor system.
More recently, Sartori et al. [13], in a TMS study, showed that an
observed action calling for an implicit complementary action
might have the ability to prime non-identical responses, adding
more evidence about a flexible context-dependent view of the
action simulation system triggered by observation.
To summarize, there is some indication that observing an action
in an evocative task-sharing situation triggers motor brain
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activations that may explain the motor facilitation effects found for
the action that is complementary to the one that is observed. From
these findings it may derive that observing an individual
performing an action in an evocative task-sharing context would
resemble acting in the very same context by performing the
complementary action. In the present work, it was our intention to
assess whether simulation of complementary actions in an
evocative task-sharing condition, and actual performance of the
same actions in a complete task sharing condition, translates into
comparable motor learning effects. In other words, it was aimed at
assessing whether physical and observational practice generate
comparable motor learning effects.
A paradigm that seems particularly suited to test this prediction
is the social version of the transfer of learning paradigm introduced
by Milanese et al. [14,15]. This paradigm, in which participants
after practicing on a task are transferred to a similar task, was
developed to study the effect produced by previous practice on the
Simon task performed jointly by two participants ([16], see also
[17,18]). In the joint Simon task, two participants sitting in right-
left positions respond to a non-spatial feature (for instance, color)
of stimuli that are presented on the right or on the left of the screen
(e.g., the left person responding to red stimuli, the right person
responding to green stimuli). As when the task is performed by one
single participant pressing two right-left keys ([19], for reviews see
[20,21]), performance is faster and more accurate when stimulus
and response positions correspond (e.g., red stimulus requiring left
response appearing on the left) than when they do not correspond
(e.g., red stimulus requiring left response appearing on the right).
The Simon task indexes the tendency to react to the same side of
the source of stimulation, even if stimulus position is not relevant
to select the correct response (e.g. [22]). It is considered a conflict
task in which the response that spatially corresponds to stimulus
position is automatically activated (e.g. [23]), likely because the
stimulus is focused by spatial attention (e.g. [24]). In corresponding
trials, this automatically activated response corresponds to the one
indicated by task instructions and, as a consequence, performance
is more efficient. Differently, in non-corresponding trials, the
activated response interferes with the execution of the required
response (e.g. [25,26]). To note, in the individual Simon task the
participant is required to perform binary choice responses (i.e., a
choice RT task) while in the joint Simon task the participant is
required to perform a single response (i.e., a go/no-go task)
alongside another participant performing another single response
(i.e., a complementary go/no-go task). Importantly, when the
same go/no-go task is performed by a single individual, without
the co-actor, no Simon effect normally emerges. It has been
suggested that the emergence of the Simon effect when the task is
distributed between two participants provides evidence that
participants represented their co-actor’s task and integrated their
own and the other’s actions in action planning (see [27] for a
review, see also [28] for a critical review).
Milanese et al. [14] found that, as for individual performance
(e.g. [29,30]), the joint Simon effect is modulated by prior practice.
Specifically, if before performing the joint Simon task, participants
perform a joint spatial compatibility task each responding to
stimulus location by emitting a spatially incompatible response
(that is, the participant on the left has to emit the left response to
right stimuli, while the participant on the right has to emit the
right response to left stimuli), the Simon effect is eliminated for
both participants (that is, there is no difference between
corresponding and non-corresponding trials). The disappearance
of the Simon effect following a joint spatial compatibility task with
an incompatible S-R mapping (see Figure 1), from now on referred
to as social transfer of learning (SToL) effect, suggests that S-R
associations acquired during joint physical practice are transferred
to similar tasks, performed jointly.
Interestingly, Milanese et al. [15] found that there is not SToL
effect if participants switch their sitting positions in between the
practice and the transfer sessions, that is, when the participant sitting
on the left in the practice session, carried out the joint Simon task
sitting on the right and the participant sitting on the right in the
practice session carried out the joint Simon task sitting on the left.
This indicates that participants represent the joint spatial compat-
ibility task performed during practice in terms of the spatial relations
between themselves and the co-actor, as responding agents, and with
respect to stimulus positions. If these specific S-R associations
acquired during physical practice are not maintained during the
subsequent Simon task, no SToL takes place.
In the present work, we conducted two experiments employing
a modified version of the SToL paradigm (see Information S1). In
both experiments, we compared a condition in which participants
kept their sitting positions across tasks with a condition in which
they switched position from one task to the other. In Exper-
iment 1, that served to establish a reference baseline on the effect
of physical practice, coupled participants performed together the
practice and the transfer tasks. Based on previous studies [14,15],
we expected to find the SToL effect in the Non-Switch Condition
only. In Experiment 2, we created an evocative task-sharing
context by requiring to one of the participants in the couple to
observe the other performing the practice task by responding to
the contralateral stimulus in a go/no-go fashion. This context was
evocative of a task-sharing context because, when the stimulus was
presented in the contralateral position with respect to the observer,
it called for her/his potential response. If observational practice, as
physical practice, entails motor learning consequences, then, the
observer should show a SToL effect. Furthermore, if observers
during practice complete the task-sharing situation by simulating
to perform the complementary action, then, in analogy to physical
practice, the observer should not show a SToL effect if s/he
switches sitting position with the agent after the practice session.
Methods
Participants
Forty-eight undergraduate students (36 female, age range 19–
25 years) took part in Experiment 1, and thirty-six students (28
female, age range 19–24 years) took part in Experiment 2.
Informed verbal consent was obtained from all participants after
the nature and possible consequences of the study were explained
to them.
Figure 1. Schematic representation of the experimental
conditions of the SToL paradigm used by Milanese et al. [14].
In the baseline session participants performed a joint Simon task, in the
practice session they practiced with a joint spatially incompatible task,
and in the transfer session they performed again the joint Simon task. A
and B refer to the two participants.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0043311.g001
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All were naı¨ve as to the purpose of the experiment and reported
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Once selected, they were
randomly paired and each couple was randomly assigned to one of
two experimental conditions (Non-Switch Condition or Switch
Conditions). Since in Experiment 2 the evaluation of agents’
performance in the Switch condition was unnecessary (because
already assessed in Experiment 1), in this condition the agent was
a confederate of the experimenter.
Stimuli and Procedure
Stimuli consisted of solid squares (white in the spatial compati-
bility task, green and red in the Simon task) presented on a black
screen, 9.5 cm to the left or to the right of a central fixation cross
(161 cm). Participants sat in front of a PC monitor, at a viewing
distance of about 70 cm. Stimuli presentation was controlled by E-
Prime (Psychology Software Tools Inc. [31]). In both tasks,
responses were executed by pressing the ‘‘z’’ or ‘‘–’’ key of a
standard Italian keyboard with the left or right index finger,
respectively.
Each experiment consisted of two consecutive sessions separated
by a 5-min interval: a practice session and a transfer session. In the
practice session participants were administered a spatial compat-
ibility task with an incompatible S-R mapping, whereas in the
transfer session they were administered a Simon task.
In both tasks, a trial began with presentation of the fixation
cross at the center of a black background. After 1 sec the stimulus
appeared to the right or to the left of fixation. In the spatial
compatibility task, the stimulus remained visible for 600 ms and
maximum time allowed for a response was 1200 ms. In the Simon
task, the stimulus remained visible for 800 ms and maximum time
allowed for a response was 1 sec. A response terminated the trial
and the inter-trial interval was 1 sec.
In Experiment 1 both tasks were performed jointly, in front of
the same computer screen, with participants sitting alongside each
other (see Figure 2). In the practice session participants were asked
to respond to only one stimulus location by pressing the
contralateral key: the participants sitting on the left responded to
the right stimuli by pressing the left key with the left index finger,
whereas the participants sitting on the right responded to the left
stimuli by pressing the right key with the right index finger. In
Experiment 2 only the Simon task was performed jointly. During
the practice task only one participant for each pair was required to
respond, while the other one was asked to watch carefully without
emitting any response. More precisely, the agent was instructed to
respond to contralateral stimuli (e.g., when the agent was seated on
the right chair, s/he responded to left stimuli with the right key,
whereas when the agent was seated on the left chair, s/he
responded to right stimuli with the left key).
During the Simon task, each participant was instructed to
respond to only one stimulus color. The mapping of the Simon
task was balanced between participants.
For both experiments, in the Non-Switch Condition participants
kept the same sitting positions across practice and transfer sessions,
while in the Switch Condition participants exchanged their sitting
positions after the practice session. In the Switch Condition of
Experiment 2 the agent was a confederate of the experimenter.
The practice session consisted of 12 practice trials and
300 experimental trials that were divided into three blocks of
100 trials each; the transfer sessions consisted of 12 practice trials
and 160 experimental trials that were divided into two blocks of
80 trials each.
Results
For both experiments only the data of the Simon task were
considered. Errors were very few and they were not further
analyzed (Experiment 1: 1.1% for the Non-Switch Condition,
1.3% for the Switch Condition; Experiment 2: 0.8% for the Non-
Switch Condition, 0.6% for the Switch Condition).
Experiment 1
To assess the magnitude of the joint Simon effect in the two
conditions, a repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA)
with Condition (Switch vs. Non-Switch) as a between-subjects
factor and Correspondence (corresponding vs. non-corresponding)
as a within-subject factor (see Table 1) was conducted on
participants’ reaction times (RTs). The Newman-Keuls test was
used for all post-hoc comparisons.
The main effect of Correspondence was significant, F (1,
46) = 11.9, p,.01, g2p = 20, as was the two-way interaction
between Condition and Correspondence, F (1, 46) = 13.1, p ,.
001, g2p = 22. Post-hoc analyses showed that the difference
between corresponding and non-corresponding trials (i.e., the
Simon effect) was significant only for the Switch Condition
(p,.001). A further analysis indicated that the performance of the
two groups of agents in each condition did not differ (ps..17).
Figure 2. Schematic representation of the experimental
conditions of the SToL paradigm used in the present work. In
the practice session participants performed a joint spatially incompat-
ible task, and in the transfer session they performed the joint Simon
task. In the Non-Switch Condition participants kept the same sitting
position from the practice to the transfer session, while in the Switch
Condition they switched their sitting positions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0043311.g002
Table 1. Agents’ Performance in Experiment 1.
Non-Switch
Condition
Switch
Condition
Corresponding 322 (63) 332 (62)
Non-corresponding 322 (64) 347 (66)
Simon effect 0 15*
Mean correct RTs in ms, standard deviations (in brackets) for corresponding and
non-corresponding trials for the Non-Switch and Switch conditions of
Experiment 1.The Simon effect was calculated by subtracting RTs on
corresponding trials from RTs from non-corresponding trials (asterisk denotes
significant differences).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0043311.t001
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Experiment 2
A repeated measures ANOVA with Correspondence (corre-
sponding vs. non-corresponding trials) as within-subject variable
and Participant’s role (agent in the Non-Switch condition, observer
in the Non-Switch condition, and observer in the Switch condition)
as between-subjects variable was conducted on RTs (see Table 2).
The main effect of Correspondence, F(1, 33) = 17.07, p,.001,
g2p = 34, was further modulated by Participant’s role, as indicated
by the significant two-way interaction, F(2, 33) = 4.74, p,.05,
g2p = 22. Post-hoc analyses showed that the difference between
corresponding and non-corresponding trials (i.e., the Simon effect)
was significant only for the observers who switched position across
practice and transfer session (p,.001). Neither the agent (340 vs.
344 ms for corresponding and non-corresponding trials, respec-
tively) nor the observer (345 vs. 350 ms for corresponding and
non-corresponding trials, respectively) in the Non-Switch condi-
tion showed a significant Simon effect. A follow-up analysis
showed that the 4-ms Simon effect shown by the agents and the 5-
ms Simon effect shown by the observers did not differ (p = .73).
Hence, learning effects deriving from observing a practice task in
an evocative task-sharing context do not seem to differ from those
deriving from actually performing a joint practice task.
Comparison between the two experiments
A possible way to assess whether the data pattern in the two
experiments is equivalent would be to perform an equivalence test
[32]. Equivalence tests require to make an a priori decision
concerning the minimum difference between two groups that would
be important to make the groups nonequivalent. However, since in
our case this minimum difference would be the result of a completely
arbitrary decision, we decided to use a differ analysis. Specifically,
we assessed whether the effect of the interaction between condition
(Non-Switch vs. Switch) and correspondence (indicative of the
elimination of the Simon effect in the non-switch condition only)
differed between the two experiments. To this end, all participants’
RTs were submitted to a repeated measures ANOVA with
Experiment and Condition (non-switch vs. switch) as between-
subjects factors and Correspondence as within-subject factor.
This analysis showed a main effect of Correspondence, F(1,
80) = 32.26, p,.001, g2p = 29, and a significant interaction
between Correspondence and Condition, F(1,80) = 21.10,
p,.001, g2p = 21. Crucially, this two-way interaction was not
further modulated by Experiment, F,1, hence indicating that the
data pattern emerging form the interaction between Condition
and Correspondence did not differ between the two experiments.
This result clearly demonstrates that the SToL effect found in the
Non-Switch Condition does not differ between Experiments.
Discussion
This study was aimed at assessing observational learning
occurring in an evocative task-sharing context in which an
individual observes another individual performing her/his half of
the task. We reasoned that observing someone else performing an
action that calls for a complementary action should bring to the same
effects evident when actually performing the action complementary
to the observed action. If this is the case, observational practice in
evocative task-sharing should generate motor learning effects
comparable to those obtained after physical practice.
Two experiments employing the SToL paradigm [14,15] were
designed to test this prediction. In Experiment 1 both participants
performed jointly the practice session, while in Experiment 2 one
participant observed a confederate performing half of the practice
session. This was the only difference between the two experiments.
In both experiments, for the reason exposed above, the control
condition was when participants switched their sitting positions in
between the practice and the transfer sessions. In this case, no
SToL was expected.
Experiment 1 clearly replicated the pattern of results obtained
in previous studies: SToL was present only when participants kept
their sitting position across sessions (Non-Switch Condition). When
they switched sitting positions (Switch Condition) a regular 15-ms
joint Simon effect was obtained. In line with Milanese et al. [15],
we interpreted this result as an indication that participants
represented the joint spatial compatibility task in terms of the
spatial relations between themselves and the co-actor. If these
spatial relations were kept constant in the subsequent Simon task,
then there was SToL. On the contrary, when participants’ position
changed from the practice to the transfer task (Switch Condition),
the SToL effect did not occur, suggesting that participants’
representations of the practice and transfer tasks did not overlap
enough to permit SToL. These results also suggest that during the
practice session participants did not implicitly acquire an abstract
response selection strategy based on an ‘‘emit the alternative
response’’ rule, as it happens when the transfer of learning is
studied in individual performance [33]. If this were the case, they
should have shown a modulation of the Simon effect irrespective
of the change of spatial relations caused by the change of sitting
positions. Thus, provided that task spatial relations are invariant
across tasks, what is possibly acquired and transferred is the link
between specific S-R spatial features.
According to our predictions, in Experiment 2 we expected to
find a) a SToL effect in the observer but b) the effect should not
arise if s/he switches sitting position with the agent after the
practice session. Both these predictions were confirmed: the
observer showed SToL when s/he kept the same sitting position
across the practice and the transfer tasks (i.e., Non-Switch
Condition), while no evidence of SToL was found when the
observer switched sitting position from the practice to the transfer
task (i.e., Switch Condition).
On the whole, these findings suggest that in an evocative task-
sharing context, the observer implicitly learns S-R associations and
transfers this motor learning to similar tasks. Indeed, we found clear
evidence that the motor simulation mechanism activates motor
representations to complete task-sharing by performing the com-
plementary action. Interestingly, the agent also showed SToL even
when the other participant simply observed the practice task, while
previous investigations found no evidence of transfer of learning
when an agent performed the go/no-go practice task alone [14].
This means that also the agent’s representation of the task includes
the observer as a potential partner responding to one stimulus. Thus,
in evocative task-sharing situations, the representation of the other’s
Table 2. Observers’ Performance in Experiment 2.
Non-Switch
Condition
Switch
Condition
Corresponding 345 (54) 320 (63)
Non-corresponding 350 (50) 338 (72)
Simon effect 5 18*
Mean correct RTs in ms, standard deviations (in brackets) for corresponding and
non-corresponding trials for the Non-Switch and Switch conditions of
Experiment 2. The Simon effect was calculated by subtracting RTs on
corresponding trials from RTs from non-corresponding trials (asterisk denotes
significant differences).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0043311.t002
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task, which leads to the integration of one’s own and of the other’s
actions in action planning, does not necessitate that both individuals
actually perform their half of the task.
To summarize, the present results provide further evidence of
how flexible and context-dependent the motor simulation evoked
by observed actions can be. Sartori et al. [13] demonstrated that
observed actions calling for an implicit complementary response
might prime complementary actions. Our findings extend their
results to task-sharing situations, demonstrating that the observa-
tion of an action calling for a complementary action, similarly to
actual performance, translates into motor learning. According to
Sartori et al. [13], observation of an action that calls for a
complementary action leads initially to an automatic simulation of
the observed action in order to experience and understand what is
observed, then the complementary action is activated. The results
of the present study support this view, by showing evidence of
motor learning deriving from the simulation of the complementary
action.
The present results have important practical implications. The
understanding of the mechanisms underlying observational
learning and of the conditions in which it occurs is particularly
valuable because observational learning is fundamental not only
for acquiring skills in everyday life but also for neuromotoric
rehabilitation in a variety of medical conditions causing the loss or
limitation of motor abilities. In recent years, the discovery that
action observation activates the same cortical motor areas that are
involved in the execution of the observed actions has led to the
development of a new rehabilitative approach, called Action
Observation Therapy, that consists in asking patients to observe,
for instance, video clips showing daily actions and to imitate them
afterward. For instance Ertelt et al. [34] found that the
observation of everyday purposeful actions matched with physical
practice led to a significant improvement of motor functions that
lasted for at least 8 weeks after the end of the intervention. This
improvement was significantly higher than deriving from physical
training alone. In general, Action Observation Therapy is based
on the imitation of observed individual actions. Our results suggest
that it might be also used in joint contexts to train the appropriate
complementary actions. Understanding when and what humans
learn while observing the actions of others may help in identifying
which motor disabilities may gain benefit from the application of
therapies based on action observation. Future research should be
directed at generalizing the conclusions derived from the present
study by employing tasks involving more complex motor abilities
and by evaluating the role of motor competencies and of the
intention to learn.
Supporting Information
Supporting Information S1 Description of the SToL
paradigm used by Milanese et al. [14]. The SToL paradigm
used in the present study slightly differed from the version
originally developed by Milanese et al. [14]. In the original
paradigm, coupled participants performed jointly three consecu-
tive sessions. In the first session (baseline) participants performed a
joint Simon task, in the second session (practice session) they
performed a spatial compatibility task with an incompatible
mapping between stimulus and response, while in the third session
(transfer session) they performed again the joint Simon task (see
Figure 1). Since the present work was focused on observational
learning in task-sharing, we thought it important to test the SToL
of observers who had not performed the Simon task at baseline,
that is, had no prior experience of task-sharing during the
execution of the Simon task. For this reason, no baseline session
was included.
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